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INTRODUCTION 
Section 413(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act establishes several 
factors to be considered in determining whether an injured worker is entitled to a 
preliminary determination of permanent total disability. One of those factors— 
found in subsection 413(l)(c)(iv)—requires the Labor Commission to determine 
whether the injured worker cannot perform other work "reasonably" available, 
taking into consideration the injured worker's age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity and functional capacity. 
The Commission has promulgated Rule R612-1-1 O.D.I to identify the 
subsidiary considerations that are necessary to determine whether other work is 
"reasonably" available to an injured worker. These considerations include the 
location, stability and wage rate of the work. 
LPI Services and Travelers Indemnity Co. ("LPI" hereafter) argue that Rule 
R612-1-10.D.1 is inconsistent with the statutory provisions of § 413(l)(c)(iv). 
Respondents Michael McGee and the Utah Labor Commission respectfully 
disagree. Respondents believe that Rule R612-1-10.D.1 is an appropriate exercise 
of the Commission's discretion to interpret and apply § 413(l)(c)(iv)'s 
"reasonableness" requirement. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2)(a) and § 34A-2-801(8), Utah Code Annotated. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C consistent with § 34A~2-413(l)(c)(iv) of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act? 
Preservation of issue for review: LPI raised this issue in proceedings 
before the Commission, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. 
(Record, vol 1, pages 154-166.) 
Standard of review: LPI argues this Court should apply a "correction of 
error" standard in determining whether Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C is consistent with § 
413(l)(c )(iv). Under this standard of review, the Court simply would substitute 
its judgment for that of the Commission in determining what "reasonable" means 
in § 413(l)(c)(iv). However, Utah's appellate courts have rejected this kind of 
mechanical approach. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Morton International, 
814 P. 2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991): 
. . . it is not the characterization of an issue as a mixed question of 
fact and law or the characterization of the issue as a question of 
general law that is dispositive of the determination of the appropriate 
level of judicial review. Rather, what has developed as the 
dispositive factor is whether the agency, by virtue of its experience 
or expertise, is in a better position than the courts to give effect to 
the regulatory objective to be achieved. 
Whether Rule R612-l-10.D.l.e is contrary to § 413(l)(c)(iv) depends on 
the meaning of "reasonable" as the word is used in § 413(l)(c)(iv). As discussed 
in Point One of this brief, the Commission has discretion to answer that question. 
This Court should review the Commission's judgment for "abuse of discretion" 
pursuant to § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
2 
("UAPA"; Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated), and uphold the 
Commission's rule if it is within the bounds of reasonableness. King v. Industrial 
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative in this proceeding. They 
are set out in full in Appendix A of this brief. 
• Section 34A-2-413 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (Title 34A, 
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1997). 
• Rule R612-1-10, "Workers' Compensation Rules—Procedures," Utah 
Administrative Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: LPI seeks judicial review of a decision by the Appeals 
Board of the Utah Labor Commission concluding that Michael McGee was 
entitled to a preliminary determination of permanent total disability pursuant to § 
34A-2-413(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
Course of Proceedings: On August 8, 2003, Mr. McGee filed an amended 
application for hearing with the Labor Commission, seeking permanent total 
disability compensation for injuries suffered while working for LPI Services. 
(Record at 25.) Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse held an evidentiary 
hearing on Mr. McGee's claim on October 31, 2003. (R. at 31.) In a decision 
issued on April 12, 2004, Judge La Jeunesse concluded that Mr. McGee was 
entitled to a preliminary finding of permanent total disability, subject to LPFs 
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statutory right to submit a plan to reemploy Mr. McGee. (R, at 33-47; Judge La 
Jeunesse's decision is attached to this brief as Exhibit B.) On May 11, 2004, LPI 
submitted a reemployment plan for Mr. McGee. (R. at 53-72.) Judge La Jeunesse 
approved the plan on February 15, 2005. (R. at 143-146.) 
On April 15, 2005, LPI filed a motion asking the Labor Commission's 
Appeals Board to review Judge La Jeunesse's preliminary determination of 
permanent total disability. (R. at 154-167.)1 The Appeals Board issued its 
decision on December 28, 2006, denying LPFs motion for review and affirming 
Judge La Jeunesse's determination. (R. 200-203; the Appeals Board decision is 
attached to this brief as Exhibit C.) LPI then petitioned for appellate judicial 
review of the Appeals Board's decision. 
Statement of Facts: LPI does not dispute the underlying facts set forth in 
Judge La Jeunesse's decision (Appendix B) and adopted by the Appeals Board. 
(Appendix C.) Although LPI has interspersed argument with the statement of fact 
contained in its brief, respondents do not believe it is necessary to restate the facts 
here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whether an administrative rule is consistent with its underlying statute 
depends on the meaning of the statute itself. Thus, LPFs argument that the 
1 LPFs motion for review was deemed timely pursuant to Administrative Law 
Judge Hann's order of March 3, 2005, which extended the filing period until April 
17,2005. (R. at 150-151.) 
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Commission's Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C is inconsistent with § 413(l)(c )(iv) of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act necessarily raises the more fundamental 
question: What does § 413(l)(c )(iv) mean? 
Section 413(l)(c )(iv) requires the Commission to determine whether other 
work is "reasonably" available for an injured worker. The Commission has both 
explicit and implicit discretion in making that determination. 
• Section 34A-1-301 of the Utah Labor Commission Act (Title 
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated) explicitly grants the Commission 
"full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the 
law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." 
• By using the word "reasonably"—a word that is subjective and 
undefined—in § 413(l)(c)(iv), the Legislature implicitly authorized the 
Commission to interpret and apply the word in the context of the statute. 
Whether Commission's discretion is viewed as explicit or implicit, the 
Commission has the duty to determine whether work is "reasonably" available for 
purposes of § 413(l)(c)(iv). The Commission is well-suited to this responsibility 
because of its expertise in modem employment relationships and its understanding 
of the workers' compensation system. The Commission's judgment, reflected in 
Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C, should be upheld so long as it is not unreasonable. 
The Commission's Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C identifies the subsidiary factors 
that the Commission considers important in determining whether other work is 
reasonably available. These factors are: 1) the stability and regularity of the work; 
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2) the work's location; and 3) the wage attached to the work. By considering the 
factors as part of the determination of "reasonableness," the rule screens out work 
that is not reasonable because it is too uncertain or undependable, too distant, or 
not economically viable.2 
The standards for "reasonableness" contained in Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C are 
consistent with the purpose of § 413(l)(c)(iv) and other provisions of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. More importantly, the rule is consistent with the 
Commission's obligation to liberally construe and apply the Act to provide 
coverage and resolve any doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of an 
injured employee." Salt Lake City Corp, v. Labor Commission, 569 Utah Adv. 
Reports 17, 19 (Utah 2007). 
In summary, the Commission has discretion to determine what 
"reasonable" means in the context of § 413(l)(c)(iv). The Commission's 
judgment on that issue, as set forth in Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C and as applied to Mr. 
McGee's claim for permanent total disability compensation, should be upheld by 
this Court. 
2 Respondents acknowledge the textual difficulties presented by § 34A-2-
413(l)(c)(iv). The statute identifies two primary considerations: 1) whether work 
is reasonably available, and 2) whether the injured worker can actually do that 
work. The statute then enumerates particular factors (age, education, past work 
experience, and medical/functional capacity) but does not specifically state 
whether the enumerated factors apply to the determination of whether other work 
is "reasonably" available, or to the determination of whether the injured worker 
can actually perform such work. This is largely a semantic difference; under 
either formulation, the considerations identified in Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C are a 
reasonable exercise of the Commission's discretion under the statute. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE COMMISSION IS ENTITLED TO 
EXERCISE DISCRETION IN INTERPRETING 
"REASONABLENESS" UNDER §413(l)(c )(iv). 
LPI challenges the Commission's interpretation and application of § 
413(l)(c)(iv). "Appellate courts defer to an agency's statutory interpretation only 
when there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in 
question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory 
language. (Citations and internal punctuation omitted.)" "Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review—Revised"" Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Bar Journal,Vol. 
12, No. 8, October 1999. 
This Court has explained the analytical model that determines whether an 
agency's interpretation or application of statute is entitled to deference. 
First, we determine whether the legislature explicitly granted 
deference to the agency to interpret or apply statutory language at 
issue If we find such a grant, we review under section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That is we afford the agency 
some deference and assess whether its action is within the bounds of 
reasonableness. 
Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of discretion, we 
examine the language of the statue and the statutory framework for 
an implicit grant of discretion. If the statutory language is broad and 
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations we will assume the 
legislature has chosen to defer to the policy making expertise of the 
agency and we will find an implicit grant of discretion and review 
the action under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. 
King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P. 2d 1287. 
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Applying this analysis to § 413(l)(c)(iv), both explicit and implicit grants 
of discretion to the Commission can be found. 
Explicit discretion. Section 34A-1-301 of the Utah Labor Commission Act 
grants the Commission "the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it 
administers." This authority extends to § 413(l)(c)(iv) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act and constitutes an explicit legislative grant of discretion to the 
Commission to use its informed judgment to establish when other work is 
"reasonably" available to an injured worker. 
Implicit discretion. In Morton International, 814 P.2d at 590, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that: 
. . . courts have also recognized that grants of discretion may be 
implied from the statutory language. For example, we have held that 
when the operative terms of a statute are broad and generalized, 
these terms bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their 
interpretation to the responsible agency. We have also granted an 
agency's statutory interpretation deference when the statutory 
language suggested that the legislature had left the specific question 
at issue unresolved. 
With respect to § 413(l)(c)(iv), the statute requires the Commission to 
determine whether other work is "reasonably" available for an injured worker. 
The Legislature has not defined what "reasonable" means in the context of this 
statute. Furthermore, "reasonableness" is a subjective concept; its meaning 
depends on the context in which it is applied. The Legislature's use of 
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"reasonably" in § 413(l)(c)(iv) therefore "bespeak[s] a legislative intent to 
delegate [its] interpretation to the responsible agency." Morton, Ibid. 
In a case such as this, where the Commission's interpretation and 
application of § 413(l)(c)(iv) is entitled to deference, this Court will review the 
Commission's action pursuant to § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) of UAPA, "affording] the 
[Commission] some deference and assess whether its action is within the bounds 
of reasonableness." King v Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d at 1286. 
For its part, LPI argues that this Court should not grant any deference to the 
Commission's interpretation of § 413(l)(c)(iv). Instead, LPI argues that the 
determination of whether an administrative rule is consistent with controlling 
statute is a question of law, reviewed for correction of error with no deference to 
the agency determination. In other words, LPI asks this Court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the Commission in determining whether other work is 
"reasonably" available. 
In arguing for a non-deferential standard of review, LPI relies on three 
appellate decisions that applied the correction of error standard in judging whether 
administrative rules were consistent with statutory provisions. Each of these 
decisions is distinguishable from the circumstances of this case. 
• In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993), the statute in question specifically 
defined "manufacturer" by reference to the Standard Industrial 
Classification code. The Tax Commission's rule imposed additional 
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definitional elements. In the absence of any grant of discretion to the Tax 
Commission to define "manufacturer," the Supreme Court struck down the 
Tax Commission's restrictive definition. 
• In Draughton v. Dep't of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 
(Utah App. 1999), this Court invalidated a DHRM rule that had the effect 
of limiting protections against demotion that were otherwise available by 
statute. Although not specifically discussed in the Court's opinion, it 
appears that DHRM lacked any explicit or implicit discretion to interpret 
the statutory provisions in question. The Court therefore applied a 
correction of error standard in determining whether DHRM's rule was 
consistent with the underlying statute. 
• This Court's decision in Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
762 P.2d 1119 (Utah App. 1988), was issued prior to the "standard of 
review" jurisprudence subsequently articulated in Morton International v. 
Tax Commission, 814 P. 2d 581 (Utah 1991), State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 
(Utah 1994), King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 
1993), and other appellate decisions. Consequently, the opinion in 
Crowther does not address the issue of agency discretion and assumes that 
a "correction of error" standard is applicable. 
The common thread that distinguishes the foregoing cases from the matter 
at hand is that none of the cases deal with a situation in which the administrative 
agency was granted discretion to interpret or apply the underlying statute. In the 
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absence of such agency discretion, the courts properly applied a "correction of 
error" standard of review. But in this case, the Labor Commission has been 
granted discretion to determine what "reasonable" means in the context of § 
413(l)(c)(iv). Consequently, the Commission's judgment is subject to the more 
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of review, and the Commission's 
judgment should be upheld if it is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
POINT TWO: THE COMMISSION'S RULE R612-1-10.D.1.C 
IS CONSISTENT WITH § 413(l)(c )(iv). 
Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C is consistent with the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act in general, and with § 413(l)(c)(iv) in particular. 
In Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, "Nature of Workers' 
Compensation,": Vol. 1, §1.03[2], Professor Larson describes the fundamental 
social purpose that is common to workers' compensation systems throughout the 
United States: 
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is 
belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most 
dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for 
the victims of work-connected injuries.. . . 
Chief Justice Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals, eloquently 
expressed the same point in a decision issued during the formative years of the 
workers' compensation systems: 
. . . . The Workmen's Compensation Law was framed to supply an 
injured workman with a substitute for wages during the whole or at 
least a part of the term of disability. He was to be saved from 
becoming one of the derelicts of society, a fragment of human 
wreckage. (Citations omitted.) He was to have enough to sustain 
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him in a fashion measurably consistent with his former habits of life 
during the trying day of readjustment. 
Surace v. Danna, 161 N.E. 315 (N.Y. 1923). 
Utah's workers' compensation system shares this objective. In Reteuna v. 
Industrial Commission, 185 P. at 537, decided only two years after the Legislature 
enacted Utah's workers' compensation system, our Supreme Court observed: 
The beneficent purposes of the (workers' compensation) act, and of 
similar acts, have been repeatedly stated by the courts of this and 
other states. It has not only for its object to secure compensation to 
an injured employee or to those dependent upon one killed by 
accident while so employed, but to relieve society of the care and 
support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial accident. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is intended to protect injured 
workers by replacing, to some extent, wages that have been losi as a result of work 
accidents. This allows injured workers to support themselves and their dependents 
without private charity or government welfare. And consistent with this general 
policy, § 34A-2-409(l) of the Act specifically provides that: [e]xcept as otherwise 
provided . . . the average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the 
injury is the basis upon which to compute the weekly compensation rate . . . ." 
By tying compensation to pre-injury earnings in at least an approximate 
fashion, the Act allows an injured worker to, in the words of Chief Justice 
Cardozo, "have enough to sustain him in a fashion measurably consistent with his 
former habits of life." Surace v. Danna, 161 N.E. at 315. The Commission's rule 
R612-1-10.D.1.C is consistent with this objective. 
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POINT THREE: LPI'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO RULE 
R612-1-10.D.1.C ARE WITHOUT MERIT, 
LPI has raised a number of specific objections to Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C. 
Some of these arguments overlap; others are not fully explained. Below, 
respondents catalogue and respond to LPI's objections. 
Consideration of factors not specifically mentioned in statute. LPI 
argues that in determining whether other work is "reasonably available" the 
Commission has no discretion to consider any factor not specifically identified in 
the statute. This brief has already responded to the main thrust of that argument. 
However, it is necessary to discuss the untenable consequences that LPI's 
argument would have on injured workers. 
Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C requires evaluation of whether other work is 
"reasonably" available to an injured worker in light of the other work's 1) 
stability, 2) location, and 3) wage. Although LPI focuses its attack on the rule's 
wage requirement, the logic of LPI's argument would also invalidate the rule's 
other factors of stability and location. Consequently, if LPI's argument is 
accepted, it would be improper for the Commission to consider whether "other 
work" is regular, steady and readily available. Likewise, it would be improper to 
consider the location of "other work," even if the work involved an excessive 
commute or required the injured worker to move to an entirely new location. 
LPI's argument cannot be squared with § 413(l)(c)(iv)'s requirement that other 
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work be "reasonably" available, nor can it be reconciled with Workers' 
Compensation Act's general purpose of protecting injured workers. 
The same can be said for LPI's argument that any work paying at least 
minimum wage is "reasonably" available. The facts of Mr. McGee's case are 
illustrative. Prior to his work accident, Mr. McGee worked 40 hours a week and 
earned $17.50 per hour as a building engineer. His dependents consisted of a wife 
and child. Pursuant to § 413(2), Mr. McGee would be entitled to receive $477 per 
week in total disability compensation. However, LPI's interpretation of § 
413(l)(c)(iv) would preclude Mr. McGee from qualifying for this compensation if 
he was capable of performing any minimum wage job. At current minimum wage 
rages, Mr. McGee's gross income would be more than cut in half, to $206 per 
week. The impact would be even greater if taxes, travel expense, and other 
expenses of working are considered. 
In summary, LPI's interpretation of § 413(l)(c)(iv) would deny some 
injured workers and their dependents the protection of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, thereby violating the purpose of the Act to "secure 
compensation to an injured employee" and "to relieve society of the care and 
3 Respondents acknowledge that the "other work" identified in this case—"lens 
stylist" and "car rental reservationist"--would pay approximately $10 per hour. 
But even at this higher wage, Mr. McGee's actual income would be substantially 
reduced. Assuming a modest 20% factor to cover taxes and expenses, Mr. 
McGee, his wife and child would receive disposable earnings of only $320 per 
week, one-third less than the amount provided by disability compensation. 
14 
support of the unfortunate victims of the industrial accident." Reteuna v. 
Industrial Commission, 185 P. at 537. 
Consistency with the rehabilitation/reemployment process. As 
previously noted, § 413 establishes a two-step process for adjudicating claims of 
permanent total disability. (See Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d 
1201, 1207 (Utah 2004).) The first step requires the Commission to make a 
preliminary determination of whether the injured worker is permanently and 
totally disabled. The second step allows the employer or insurance carrier to 
propose a plan to reemploy or rehabilitate the injured worker. LPI argues it is 
inconsistent for the Commission to apply the wage requirement of rule R612-1-
lO.D.l.c to the first step of this process, but not to the second step. 
LPFs argument fails to note an important difference between "first step" 
and "second step" proceedings. The "first step" proceeding requires the injured 
worker to make a prima facie showing of permanent total disability. Unless the 
injured worker can meet this burden, he or she receives no permanent total 
disability compensation. Without such disability compensation, the injured 
worker must look to whatever employment is available in the labor market for his 
or her support. In this context, it is appropriate to consider the level of wages 
available in the labor market for the types of work the injured worker is capable of 
performing. 
In contrast, "second step" proceeding occurs after an injured worker has 
already established a prima facie right to permanent total disability compensation. 
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Having established that prima facie right, the injured worker is entitled to payment 
of subsistence benefits from the employer or insurance carrier. (See § 
413(6)(b)(i).) And while the purpose of the second step proceeding is to 
determine whether the employer or insurance carrier can develop a feasible plan to 
rehabilitate or reemploy the injured worker, § 413(6)(d)(ii) mandates that any such 
plan "shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for 
the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation plan." 
Thus, the second step process has its own method to provide for the injured 
worker's subsistence as he or she is reintroduced to the workforce. Because the 
second step proceeding on Mr. McGee's claim is not at issue before this Court, it 
is inappropriate to consider the rules that might apply to that proceeding. 
Failure to address statutory factors. LPI argues that the ALJ's decision 
is inadequate because it did not explicitly list all the factors identified for 
consideration by § 413(l)(c) "and then include an explanation of how each 
criterion applied." (LPFs brief at page 17-18.) LPFs then extends its criticism to 
the Appeals Board for failing to correct the ALJ's purported error. 
However, LPI did not present this issue to the Appeals Board as part of its 
motion for review. (Record, vol. 1, pages 154-167.) LPFs motion for review 
raised three specific issues: 1) whether Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C was contrary to § 
413(l)(c)(iv); 2) whether the rule was contrary to the Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act; and 3) whether the rule could be applied to Mr. McGee's 
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claim. LPI did not argue that the ALJ's decision was inadequate in its discussion 
of other aspects of § 413(l)(c). 
Section 63-46b-14(2) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires 
that issues be presented to the Commission or its Appeals Board before they can 
be raised on appeal: 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency 
action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute. (Emphasis added.) 
By failing to raise its argument regarding the sufficiency of the ALJ's 
decision as part of the review proceedings before the Appeals Board, LPI waived 
the issue. It cannot now be considered on appeal. 
Allegation that other portions of Rule R612-1-10 have been invalidated. 
At page 24 of its brief, LPI states that "[t]his case would not be the first time that a 
portion of Administrative Rule R612-1-10 had to be declared invalid by this 
Court." LPI then cites this Court's decision in Target Trucking v. Labor 
Commission, 108 P.3d 128 (Utah App. 2005). LPI's assertion is both misleading 
and irrelevant. 
LPLs assertion is misleading because this Court has withdrawn support 
from the Target decision. See Ameritemps v. Labor Commission et ai, 128 P. 3d 
31 (Utah App. 2005); affd 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (SC, 1/19/07). 
LPI's assertion is irrelevant because, in Target, this Court addressed an 
entirely different section of the rule, specifically, Rule R612-1-10.C.1.C, which 
explained the parties' rights to judicial review, as follows: "A preliminary 
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determination of permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals 
Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellale judicial review." 
Admittedly, whether a party has a right to judicial review is a question of general 
law. The Commission has no discretion to interpret such matters, which must 
ultimately be decided by the appellate courts. The Commission promulgated Rule 
R612-1-10.C.1.C as guidance to litigants, and, in fact, the substance of the rule has 
now been ratified by this Court in Ameritemps, ibid. Thus, the important 
distinction between Rule R612-1-10.C.1.C and Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C is that the 
first is subject to a "correction of error" standard of review, while the second is 
subject review for abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission and Mr. McGee concede it would be within the power of 
the Legislature to create a permanent total disability compensation system that 
incorporates the standards envisioned by LPI. But the Legislature has not done 
that. Instead, it has granted discretion to the Commission to use its expertise and 
judgment to determine when other work is "reasonably available." The 
Commission's Rule R612-l-10.d.l.c establishes a test that is consistent with § 413 
itself, with the Workers' Compensation Act in general, and with the fundamental 
objective of the Act to provide a reasonable means of support to injured workers. 
As such, the rule is well within the bounds of reasonableness and should be upheld 
by this Court. 
18 
The Commission and Mr. McGee respectfully urge this Court to affirm the 
Appeals Board's determination that Mr. McGee is entitled to a preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability pursuant to § 413(1) of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2007. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 34A-2-413 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C J.S. Workmen's Compensation lump-sum compensation payment, 26 
§ 302. AL.R.5th 127. 
AX,R. — Workers' compensation reopening 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial 
accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation 
as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensa-
tion, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of 
evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination 
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(hi) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct 
cause of the employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission 
shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impair-
ments that limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combi-
nation of impairments prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has 
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability 
claim; and 
p (iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other 
M* than those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission, but is not 
binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter 
| ^ n d Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
> For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week 
fement, compensation shall be 66-%% of the employee's average weekly 
'tf(ft the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
d) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state 
|j*age weekly wage at the time of the injury; 
compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
ky plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor 
f ren, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) 
exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
f, and 
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(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly 
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in 
Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided 
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of compensation 
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the 
employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the 
employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's 
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for 
any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation 
at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total 
disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immedi-
ately after the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability 
under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total 
disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided 
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensation 
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the 
employer or its insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpay-
ment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers* 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the 
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabili-
ties amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability 
compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the 
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the 
employee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, 
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
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(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemploy-
ment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured 
Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the adminis-
trative law judge a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified 
rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to 
gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides 
the administrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance 
carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds 
a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding 
rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan submitted by the 
employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge 
shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation pay-
ments to provide for the employee's subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits 
due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any 
disability payments made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate 
disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit 
a reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily 
submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6Xd)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and dis-
ability compensation benefits, job placement services, or incentives 
calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
,K insurance carrier. 
* (ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability com-
pensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the reha-
m, bilitation process. 
[ - , (iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue 
!>.,, ..the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure 
gp& , , to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
^v* administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own 
^ i&ption to make a final decision of permanent total disability. 
If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilita-
t e s not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the 
Sfrioyee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation ben-
& period of benefits commences on the date the employee became 
.pntly totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the 
^ion based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
i) with the death of the employee; or 
ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady 
i^ep*ployer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a 
$ntly totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, 
e work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that 
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employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the 
employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment 
process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income 
from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the em-
ployer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total 
disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its 
insurance carrier, a permanently totally disabled employee may obtain 
medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions 
contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time 
work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is 
governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burdeg of proof 
to show that medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require 
the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capac-
ity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent 
total disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, 
medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the 
employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilita-
tion is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award 
shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not 
entitled to disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with 
any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without 
prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge 
finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law 
judge states specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, 
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compen-
sated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection 
(10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a 
permanent total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10), 
for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment 
responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently 
totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three 
years after an award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer 
or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
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(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations 
and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; 
and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires 
approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a 
reexamination with appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to 
rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable 
expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's 
claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamina-
tion of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge 
may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability 
benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding 
reveal evidence that reasonably raises the issue of an employee's 
continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation 
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Divi-
sion of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be 
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-
insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently 
totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) demonstrates good 
cause, as determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administra-
tive law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropri-
ate, part-time work may not be the sole basis for termination of an 
employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of 
the employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work 
under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or 
t hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and 
condition. 
n (g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge 
ttay award reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an 
Suployee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexami-
j&Jion of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee 
~ not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys 
|S shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to 
[ermanent total disability compensation benefits due. 
c, During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee 
cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' 
imirance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability 
'* jnsation benefits due the employee. 
y provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be 
Without the invalid provision or application. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 05-0114 
Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse 
SUBMISSION OF CASE: The parties waived an evidentiary hearing in this matter and 
submitted the issues to be considered by way of "Stipulation for 
Direct Referral to a Medical panel" (Stipulation). 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Michael McGee, was represented by his attorney 
Richard Burke Esq. 
The respondent, LPI Services, was represented by attorney Mark 
Sumsion Esq. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This case arose as an outgrowth of Case No. 20021225 between the same parties. In the present 
case the parties agreed to submit the narrow issues concerning the cause of Mr. McGee's 
headaches to a medical panel for resolution. 
II. ISSUES. 
1. Did Michael McGee's industrial accident on July 4, 2001 cause his headache condition at 
issue in this case? 
2. If Michael McGee's industrial accident on July 4, 2001 caused his headache condition at 
issue in this case, what medical treatment is reasonable and necessary to address the 
condition? 
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III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On December 28, 2004 the parties filed their Stipulation. I sent the Stipulation to the Medical 
panel appointed in this case. The Medical Panel filed a report on June 13, 2005. I sent the 
Medical panel Report to the parties on June 13, 2005 and gave them 15 days to file objections to 
the admissibility of the report. Neither party filed any objections to the Medical Panel Report. 
Accordingly, I accepted the Medical Panel Report into evidence and considered the matter ready 
for order. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A, Stipulated Facts. 
The parties submitted the following stipulated facts: 
1. On July 4, 2001, Michael McGee, petitioner, was involved in an industrial accident while 
in the course and scope of his employment with LPI Services. The petitioner was 
assisting four men move a 600 pound plus motor when he injured his low back and 
shoulder. 
2. The applicant subsequently developed headaches, which he claims are related to his 
industrial injury. The headache condition is the only medical condition at issue. 
3. On July 20, 2001, Dr. Larcom took x-rays of the applicant's shoulder, which 
demonstrated a hypertrophic AC joint that appeared to be of long standing duration. 
(MRE at 48). 
4. An EMG of the petitioner's shoulder was performed by Dr. Ryser on August 8, 2001, 
which revealed an axonal neuropathy. (MRE at 54-61). 
5. On August 31, 2001, Dr. Larcom indicated the EMG showed a palsy of the Infraspinatus 
branch of the suprascapular nerve at the level of the notch. (MRE. at 50). 
6. On October 29, 2001, the petitioner reported to Dr. Larcom that his shoulder pain had 
resolved. (MRE at 51). 
7. On February 25, 2002, Dr. Bowen performed a fusion at L4-5. (MRE at 224-226). 
8. The petitioner received physical therapy for his low back from April 15, 2002 to May 8, 
2002. (MRE at 66-78). 
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9. On April 29, 2002, the petitioner was seen at Pioneer Valley Hospital for severe 
headaches. A spinal tap was performed an a diluting hemorrhage was noted. A CT of the 
head was also taken, which showed minor vascular abnormality. (MRE at 236-43). 
10. That same day, an MRI of the petitioner's head was taken at University of Utah, which 
revealed non-specific white matter changes. An MRA was also taken, which was normal. 
(MRE at 194). 
11. On May 29, 2002, Dr. Savia noted the petitioner had two migraine headaches during his 
life prior to his back problems. He further indicated that the petitioner's headaches were 
indirectly related to his back problems. He further indicated the petitioner's headaches 
were indirectly related to the industrial accident because they started after physical 
therapy for the low back. (MRE at 86-89). 
12. On July 29, 2002, the petitioner was seen by Drs. Knoebel and Moress, who stated the 
headache condition was not related to the industrial accident. (MRE at 94-104). 
13. On September 5, 2002, Dr. Brown indicated the headache condition was directly related 
to the industrial accident. (MRE at 43-44) 
14. The parties stipulate that the petitioner has a 15% whole person impairment rating related 
to his low back, with 10% attributable to preexisting conditions and 5% attributable to the 
industrial accident. 
B. The Medical Cause of Michael McGee's Headache Condition. 
On June 13, 2005 the Medical Panel appointed in this case filed a report. The Medical Panel 
consisted of the chair Dr. Madison Thomas M.D., a neurologist, panel member Dr. Glen 
Momberger M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne M.D., a psychiatrist. The 
Medical Panel examined Mr. McGee, reviewed the stipulation and medical records provided by 
the parties, and reviewed the radiology films made available to them. [Medical Panel Report at 
!]• 
The Medical Panel concluded that: "The migraine-like headaches do not appear to have been a 
result of the reported injury of 4 July 2001." [id. p. 4 ^ 1]. I found the Medical Panel Report 
thorough and well reasoned. Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence in this case 
established that Mr. McGee's July 4, 2001 industrial accident did not medically cause his 
headache problems at issue in this case. Consequently, Mr. McGee's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits related to his headache problems must be dismissed. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Mr. McGee's July 4, 2001 industrial accident did not medically cause his headache problems at 
issue in this case. Consequently, Mr. McGee's claim for workers' compensation benefits related 
to his headache problems must be dismissed. 
VI. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Michael McGee's claim against LPI Services for 
workers' compensation benefits based on headaches is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED September 9, 2005. 
a Jeunesse 
r
c Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 dajra from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 













Case No. 02-1225 
LPI Services and its insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Company (referred to jointly as 
"LPI" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative 
Law Judge La Jeunesse's preliminary determination that Michael McGee is permanently and totally 
disabled for purposes of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34 A, Chapter 2, Utah 
Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. McGee claims permanent total disability compensation for a low back injury he suffered 
on July 4,2001, while working for LPI. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the claim, Judge La 
Jeunesse concluded that Mr. McGee had satisfied the criteria of §413(l)of the Act and was, 
therefore, entitled to a preliminary determination of permanent total disability. 
Among the criteria for permanent total disability contained in §413(l)(c)(iv) is the 
requirement that the injured worker "cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
account the employee's: (A) age; (B) education; (C) past work experience; (D) medical capacity; 
and (E) residual functional capacity." In applying this standard to Mr. McGee's claim, Judge La 
Jeunesse relied on the Commission's Rule 612-1-lO.D. 1 .c. to conclude that no work was reasonably 
available to Mr. McGee. 
In seeking review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision, LPI argues that the requirements of Rule 
612-1-lO.D.l.c are contrary to the statutory provisions of § 413(l)(c)(iv). Alternatively, LPI argues 
that, even if Rule 612-1-10.D.l.c is valid, it cannot be applied retroactively to Mr. McGee's claim. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
LPI does not contest Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. The Appeals Board therefore 
adopts those findings. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Compatibility of Rule 612-1-1 P.P. l.c with § 413(l)(c)(iv). In considering LPFs arguments, 
the Appeals Board acknowledges the fundamental principle that administrative rules must comply 
with statutory directives. In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a long-standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be 
consistent with its governing statutes. Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a 
governing statute is invalid. (Internal citations omitted.) 
In this case, § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) is the governing statute. It provides as follows (emphasis 
added): 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall 
conclude that: 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
The foregoing statute was enacted in 1995. Thereafter, stakeholders in the workers' 
compensation system asked the Commission to promulgate standards for determining whether other 
work was "reasonably" available within the meaning of § 413( l)(c)(iv). The Commission convened 
an ad hoc committee with representatives from the applicants' bar, insurance carriers and employers. 
The committee proposed what is now Rule 612-1-10.D. 1 .c. The rule was discussed and approved by 
the Workers' Compensation Advisory Council established by § 34A-2-107 of the Act, then 
discussed at public hearings. The Commission promulgated the rule in January 200land it has 
remained in effect since then. Rule 612-1-10.D.1 provides as follows: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other 
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if 
such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's community 
would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the 
distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
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c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant 
was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee 
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect. 
LPI now contends that subsection (c) of Rule 612-1 -10.D. 1 is invalid because it exceeds the 
scope of § 413(l)(c)(iv). Section § 413(l)(c)(iv) requires the Commission to determine whether 
other work is "reasonably available," taking into consideration, among other factors, the injured 
worker's "past work experience." In effect, LPI argues that "past work experience" refers only to 
the injured worker's duties at work, and not to any of the other terms and conditions of the work 
environment. Thus, under LPI's interpretation, aspects of the injured worker's past employment such 
as location, wage, or hours cannot be considered. 
On the other hand, the Commission's Rule 612-1-10.D.1 takes a broader view of the 
statutory term "past work experience." Under the rule, "past work experience" includes an injured 
worker's job duties, but also includes other aspects of the employment contract. The rule therefore 
takes into account the location of the injured worker's residence and past employment, previous 
wage levels, and the availability and regularity of alternative work. The Appeals Board finds the 
rule to be reasonable, consistent with the structure and purposes of the workers' compensation 
system, and within the Commission's authority. 
The Appeals Board notes LPI's argument that provisions of the Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act ("Reemployment Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated) must be 
considered in interpreting § 34A-2-413(1 )(c)(iv)'s test of "other work reasonably available." While 
it is true that § 34A-2-413 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act makes passing reference to the 
Reemployment Act, the Appeals Board finds no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to 
incorporate the various definitions of the Reemployment Act into § 413. But even if such an 
incorporation were intended, § 34A-8-104(3) of the Reemployment Act itself defines "gainful 
employment" in terms of work that is "reasonably feasible" and "reasonably attainable" in 
consideration of the injured worker's past "experience." Thus, the Reemployment Act's statutory 
formulation is only slightly different from that of § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) and, for the reasons already 
stated above, is not violated by the Commission's Rule 612-1-10.D.1. 
Finally, LPI argues that Rule 612-1 -10.D. 1 cannot be applied to claims based on injuries that 
occurred before the rule was promulgated. However, it is § 413(l)(c)(iv), rather than Rule 612-1-
1 O.D.I, which gives rise to Mr. McGee's right to benefits. The rule does nothing more than explain 
how the Commission will exercise the discretion conferred by § 413(1 )(c)(iv), to determine whether 
H f > O n n 
ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ'S DECISION 
MICHAEL MCGEE 
PAGE 4 
other work is "reasonably" available to Mr. McGee. In light of the provisions of the underlying 
statute and the function of the Commission's rule, the Appeals Board finds no reason why the rule 
cannot be applied to Mr. McGee's claim. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is consistent with the 
provisions of § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). The Appeals Board further concludes that Judge La Jeunesse 
properly applied the rule to Mr. McGee's claim. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms Judge La Jeunesse's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this £% day of December, 2006. 
Patricia S. Drawe 
> 4 *•*&%: 
Joseph E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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